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Girard Bucello IV 
22 April 2016 
INAF 491H—Dr. John Kramer 

In the Baltic region, the cold weather in wintertime comes not from the Arctic. It 
comes from the east—from Russia. 
Raimonds Vējonis 
President of Latvia 
Nobody in Europe will be abandoned. Nobody in Europe will be excluded. 
Europe only succeeds if we work together. 
Angela Merkel 
Chancellor of Germany 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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses the current state of the European security community in the aftermath of 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea from the perspective of the three Baltic countries. The research 
qualitatively analyzes government documents, official statements, and publications by, and 
interviews with, scholars and policymakers to determine how recent Russian behavior has 
affected the perspective of the Baltic states, and how they have affected NATO and the EU. This 
paper finds that the annexation of Crimea vindicated those in the Baltic who had expected such 
behavior, and determines that the Baltic states have leveraged the EU and NATO to refocus 
attention on their eastern flank.  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INTRODUCTION 
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the lynchpin of Euro-Atlantic 
security since its founding in 1949, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While its role has 
changed, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and ongoing Russian support for separatists in 
Ukraine’s Donbas region not under Kiev’s control, have brought the Alliance’s collective defense 
functions back to the forefront of discussion. There are also questions surrounding the increased 
role for the European Union (EU) in the realm of security—in particular, those aspects of 
security that concern domestic or internal security. Crimea’s annexation greatly alarmed both 
NATO and the EU, and called into question their roles in the provision of security in Europe. 
This paper seeks to address the fundamental issue of how Russia’s annexation of Crimea affected 
the stance of NATO and the EU, the two pillars of the European security community, towards 
protecting the continent. The research focuses on this question through the lens of the three 
Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—as the three members of Europe’s security 
architecture most directly affected by any changes in Russo-European relations. 
 It is of foremost importance to determine what comprises the European security 
community—and, before that, to determine the scope of the term security community. Karl 
Deutsch defines a security community as one “in which there is real assurance that the members 
of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other 
way.”  Deutsch’s definition is rather loose, so I will add a corollary: a security community is also 1
one in which members agree, through formal institutions, to use said institutions as a mechanism 
both for dispute resolution and for cooperation on matters of defense as they pertain to those 
outside of the community. One analysis, accepting Deutsch’s definition, contends that “Western 
"1
Europe is an established pluralistic security community, institutionalised as NATO (through 
transatlantic links with the United States and Canada as European powers), and the EU.”  I also 2
accept that these two institutions comprise the core of the European security community, as they 
meet the aforementioned requisites. I exclude the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), as it fails to meet Deutsch’s definition of a community “in which there is real 
assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically.”  Russia, 3
Georgia, and Ukraine are all OSCE members, yet Russia has used military force against both 
Georgia and Ukraine within the last ten years. Therefore, there is no real assurance against the 
use of force among and between all OSCE members. 
 Historically, balance of power theory has been the dominant school of thought regarding 
the affairs of European nations. The establishment of the NATO at the start of the Cold War 
would appear to be one more example of power balancing, as Western European nations 
organized, under security guarantees from the United States, against a perceived threat posed by 
the Soviet Union and its allies. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the security threat to Western Europe that had loomed over the continent appeared to 
evaporate. However, NATO did not dissolve, despite the absence of its initial raison d’être. 
Indeed, NATO engaged in an enlargement campaign, adding twelve new members (excluding the 
German Democratic Republic, which joined the Alliance upon its reunification with the NATO 
member-state of the Federal Republic of Germany). NATO, as a result, expanded its defense 
commitments well into former Warsaw Pact territory. This, coupled with the increasing degree to 
which NATO has involved itself in European political affairs—matched by increased 
involvement by political organizations such as the EU taking on additional matters of defense 
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and foreign policy—underscores the increasing complexity of the European security community. 
As such, it is all the more important to understand the mechanisms by which it operates. 
 The unique geographic position, ethnic composition, and political history of the Baltic 
republics renders this focus worthy of study in pursuit of an understanding of the European 
security community’s behavior. With the exception of Poland’s border with Russia’s Kaliningrad 
exclave, and Norway’s small and sparsely populated border with extreme northwest Russia, the 
three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania represent the main contact point between 
NATO and the Russian Federation. Though NATO has engaged in a deliberate effort to integrate 
former Warsaw Pact nations into the Alliance, the Baltic republics are also the only former 
Soviet republics to become members of both NATO and the EU. Additionally, Estonia and Latvia 
have significant ethnic Russian populations (see Figure 3), in part stemming from the Soviet 
Union’s occupation of their territory until the Cold War’s end. These factors make the 
consequences of NATO policy more grave for the Baltic states than any other NATO member 
state. Changes in NATO-Russia relations will impact the Baltic states more quickly and in 
greater measure than any other member-state. As such, it is critical to assess the position of the 
Baltic states within NATO and, more broadly, in Europe’s security architecture overall. 
 This research is qualitative in nature, consisting of an analysis of scholarly publications, 
official government statements and documents, and interviews with current and former European 
security officials and academics. This paper first discusses the relevant historical context, then 
provides a lengthier analysis of documents, statements, and interviews. It will then present the 
conclusions reached on the nature of Europe’s security architecture as recent Russian behavior 
has affected it. It will also offer a prognosis on the future of European security. Throughout, the 
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paper will demonstrate the applicability of the Baltic states’ perspective towards understanding 
the historical and contemporary European security community more broadly. 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Cold War Origins 
 The contemporary security architecture in Europe has its roots in the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War. Concerned over the prospect of Soviet influence in Europe and the 
Atlantic region, the United States and its allies in Western Europe founded NATO in 1949.  The 4
Alliance’s founding had the almost immediate effect of moving the line of defense against the 
Soviet Union further west, relieving a great defense burden on many of the European member-
states.  The Alliance had the added effect of tethering the United States to the defense of Europe, 5
assuaging concerns that, just as after the First World War, the United States would retrench and 
draw down its military presence. Historian Tony Judt writes, “NATO thus became a major 
military commitment, drawing on the seemingly limitless resources of the US economy and 
committing Americans and their allies to an unprecedented peacetime build up of men and 
matériel.”  Concurrent with, yet distinct from, NATO’s military coordination effort was a 6
European economic and political integration effort, beginning with the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. Beyond the creation of a common market 
for coal and steel in Western Europe, as well as a measure to ensure that the valuable resources 
of the Ruhr were not solely in German hands, its greatest value was as a vehicle for overcoming 
Franco-German enmity, a major barrier to interstate integration in Europe.  7
 In 1958, the Rome Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC), 
entered into force.  Building upon the successes of the ECSC, it expanded on the principles 8
"4
enshrined therein. Among other actions, it established a customs union, eliminating duties on 
goods between member-states and imposing common tariffs on non-EEC goods;  laid the 9
groundwork for the free movement of persons;  and established the forerunners to modern EU 10
institutions such as the European Commission.  In 1985, European states signed the Schengen 11
Treaty which entered into force a decade later, implementing the principles set out in the Rome 
Treaty on the free movement of persons within the EEC by gradually abolishing border 
controls.  With NATO charged with the defense of Western Europe through American security 12
guarantees, joint exercises, and an integrated military command structure, the several European 
states had used this respite to forge a framework for political and economic integration. 
The End of the Cold War and the New Order in Europe 
 The Baltic states were the first of the Soviet republics to declare independence from the 
USSR in 1991. The United States had never considered the three Baltic republics to have been a 
part of the Soviet Union after their annexation during the Second World War, and viewed their 
independence as the conclusion of an illegal occupation  Those events were only the latest in a 13
cascading effect that ultimately led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
by the end of that same year. German reunification ultimately dispelled any doubt concerning the 
future of NATO: as the German Democratic Republic (GDR) reunified with the Federal Republic 
of Germany (FRG) under the latter’s constitution, it joined the Alliance as well.  Though the 14
number of member-states in the Alliance did not increase, as the GDR ceased to exist upon 
reunification, NATO did expand its shared border further east. The Alliance integrated tens of 
thousands of GDR soldiers into its command structure as well. Moreover, governments in 
Europe were not keen to dissolve NATO. American diplomat Ronald Asmus writes, “The instinct 
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of nearly every government in Europe was to opt to maintain the Alliance in some form, if only 
as an insurance policy. German unification in NATO was the first post-Cold War enlargement of 
the Alliance and an early sign that NATO’s role in Europe was growing, not shrinking.”  NATO 15
would well outlast the conflict that its founders had established for it to fight. 
 The Alliance’s continued operation came with a shift in focus as NATO began a political 
outreach campaign to former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states. In 1994, NATO launched the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, allowing for limited forms of cooperation in defense-
related fields without any defense commitments on the part of the Alliance to PfP nations.  The 16
following year saw another major shift as the Alliance began to undertake major combat 
operations in non-NATO territory. Though the Alliance involved itself in the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia as early as 1992, it was not until 1995 that NATO conducted a campaign of 
airstrikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina intended to support United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, 
who had requested the airstrikes. Operation Deliberate Force, as the Alliance termed the mission, 
forced the Bosnian Serb Army to sue for peace, resulting in the Dayton Accords in December of 
1995. NATO subsequently deployed an Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops, followed 
a year later by a Stabilization Force (SFOR) of 32,000 troops.  NATO intervened in the Balkan 17
states again in 1999, conducting an aerial bombing campaign against Serbia to halt violence in 
the breakaway region in Kosovo. NATO maintains a Kosovo Force (KFOR) of nearly 5,000 
troops.  The Alliance has since engaged in several other operations outside the scope of Article 18
V, the section of the North Atlantic Treaty that outlines the mutual defense arrangement of 
NATO. Among them are the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in 
Afghanistan, counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, and intervention in Libya in 
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2011.  These missions represented a profound expansion of the Alliance’s profile beyond what 19
its creators had envisioned in 1949. Even the Alliance’s invocation of Article V in 2001 and 
subsequent mission, Operation Eagle Assist, was a counterterrorism operation—a function that 
the Alliance was not intended to react to at its inception.  20
 As with NATO, the EU also grew its mandate far beyond its economic roots. The Union 
had already done this to an extent through the Schengen Treaty: though it had the primary goal of 
facilitating economic transaction through the free movement of people and goods within the 
Schengen Area, there was an obvious security dimension as well in adopting common entry 
requirements to the open borders zone. 1993 saw the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
which, among other things, established a Common Foreign and Security Policy, allowing the 
European Council to “ define a common position” and stating that “Member States shall ensure 
that their national policies conform to the common positions.”  In 1999, the European Security 21
and Defense Policy (ESDP), later renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CDSP), 
became operational.  Spurred by, among other events, the chaotic and violent breakup of the 22
former Yugoslavia, the EDSP sought to give the EU “the capacity for autonomous action, backed 
up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, [...] to 
respond to international crises.”  In 2003, the Union established EU Battlegroups comprised of 23
battalion-sized (approx. 1,500 soldiers) contingents of rapidly deployable troops from donor EU 
member-states.  The EU founded the European Defence Agency a year later to further foster 24
defense cooperation among EU member-states.  The Union has deployed military assets in 25
Bosnia and Herzegovina after IFOR’s withdrawal, as well as in the Mediterranean and off the 
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coast of Somalia, to name a few.  All of these actions represented an expanded effort to integrate 26
on matters of security under the auspices of the EU. 
 During this time, both NATO and the EU pursued policies of expansion. As their 
mandates grew, so too did their membership. While the first decade after the fall of the Soviet 
Union saw moderate expansions of both bodies—three new members to each by the turn of the 
century—it was 2004 that saw the largest rounds of accession. In the newly expanded EU, the 
Baltic states joined together with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Malta, and Cyprus in the largest round of the Union’s expansion.  The Baltic states also acceded 27
to NATO, alongside Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—the Alliance’s largest round of 
expansion since its founding.  At the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the EU had eleven 28
members, while NATO had sixteen. Both now have twenty-eight members.  NATO’s expansion 29
encompassed only former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states, and while the EU’s various rounds of 
expansion included neutral states such as Austria, Finland, and Sweden, most of the EU’s 
members who joined after 1991 are former Eastern Bloc states. The Baltic States remain, in both 
organizations, the only former Soviet republics to be full members. 
Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine 
 The first crisis to the peaceful order in Europe originated in the 1990s. Russia had backed 
a separatist movement in South Ossetia, a region of Georgia, in an effort to see it united with the 
Russian province of North Ossetia.  The ceasefire that ended the fighting called for a joint 30
Georgian, Russian, and Ossetian peacekeeping force in the disputed region. On August 1 and 2, 
2008, South Ossetian paramilitary forces began shelling ethnic Georgian settlements in South 
Ossetia. On August 7, the Georgian military assaulted South Ossetian positions in response, 
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triggering an immediate reaction from Russia. Over the course of five days, the Russian military 
routed Georgian forces, affirming the de facto independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
another breakaway region in Georgia.  Russia subsequently recognized both Abkhazia and 31
South Ossetia as independent states,  establishing formal diplomatic relations despite an absence 32
of recognition from the rest of the international community. Earlier in the year, Georgia had 
petitioned NATO to establish a Membership Action Plan (MAP), a formal step before an 
invitation to begin accession talks with the Alliance. Despite lobbying from the United States on 
Georgia’s behalf, the Alliance ultimately refused to extend such a measure to Georgia.  Though 33
subsequent NATO summits have yielded closer NATO-Georgia cooperation, the Alliance has still 
not approved Georgian MAP involvement.  34
 The Russo-Georgian war provoked a strong reaction from many states, including the 
three Baltic republics, which roundly condemned Russia’s conduct in a joint statement.  NATO 35
itself, however, was largely silent. The Secretary General of the Alliance released the following 
statement: “The NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, is seriously concerned about 
the events that are taking place in the Georgian region of South Ossetia and said that the Alliance 
is closely following the situation. The Secretary General calls on all sides for an immediate end 
of the armed clashes and direct talks between the parties.”  Aside from an increase in naval 36
deployments in the Black Sea,  reaction from the US and other Alliance members was fairly 37
muted and the rhetoric largely restrained. Both NATO and the EU issued statements condemning 
Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer 
stating that “Russia's actions in recent weeks call into question Russia's commitment to peace 
and security in the Caucasus,” and that “NATO firmly supports the sovereignty and territorial 
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integrity of Georgia.”  Neither body, however, took substantial action beyond the 38
aforementioned measures. 
 Early 2014 saw another, more impactful shock to the post-Cold War order. The 
Euromaidan movement in Ukraine swept a pro-EU government into power in Kiev, triggering a 
backlash from Crimea, an autonomous republic subordinate to Ukraine. By February 27, after 
several days of anti-Ukraine and pro-Russia demonstrations on the Crimean Peninsula, 
unidentified armed men seized the Crimean Parliament.  Those members of parliament that 39
gunmen had permitted to enter voted for separatist Sergei Aksyonov as Prime Minister of 
Crimea, ousting Anatoly Mogilyov, who had supported Crimea remaining in Ukraine.  As more 40
anonymous armed men seized critical infrastructure on the peninsula, denying its use to 
Ukrainian military forces, the Crimean Parliament voted, again behind closed doors, on an 
appeal to Russia to annex the peninsula and incorporate Crimea into Russia.  Official results 41
from the referendum in mid-March showed overwhelming support for Crimea’s union with 
Russia, with claims of 95 percent of voters backing secession from Ukraine and accession to the 
Russian Federation.  By March 20, the Russian Duma had formalized Crimea’s annexation, 42
approving a treaty between Russia and Crimea to that effect and amending the Russian 
constitution to reflect the territorial change.  Subsequently, Russia admitted to the presence of 43
its armed forces during the unrest in Crimea.  In the spring and summer of 2014, unrest had 44
spread to the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in eastern Ukraine, referred to collectively as the 
Donbas. There, pro-Russian separatists, with indeterminate levels of support from the Russian 
government, began waging a conflict against the government in Kiev, intending to break away 
"10
from Ukraine.  A ceasefire is in place, though violations thereof are frequent, and the conflict 45
remains stagnant.  46
 Unlike the case of Georgia, the reaction from the EU and NATO was far more stern with 
regards to Russian activity in Ukraine. NATO indefinitely suspended cooperation with Russia 
through the NATO-Russia Council, a body established during the Alliance’s period of outreach to 
Russia after the end of the Cold War.  The Alliance also announced a scaling-up of its NATO 47
Response Force (NRF), from 13,000 soldiers to 40,000 soldiers comprised of a rotation of forces 
from member-states. NATO also announced the creation of a Very High Readiness Joint Task 
Force (VJTF) of 5,000 troops, capable of deploying within days of a crisis, as part of the NRF.  48
The EU, the United States, and Canada have imposed sanctions on the Russian Federation in 
direct response to the annexation of Crimea.  Compared to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, 49
Russia’s operations in Crimea and support for separatism in the Donbas have greatly altered the 
strategic discourse in Europe and galvanized a far stronger response from NATO and the EU. 
EXAMINING THE BALTIC PERSPECTIVE 
 As noted, it is essential to know the Baltic perspective on Europe’s security architecture if 
one is to understand the response of European institutions to Russian behavior in Crimea. This 
paper will demonstrate that, while many in the West had envisioned a future of cooperation with 
Russia, the Baltic states did not share wholeheartedly in this assessment, with policymakers 
characterizing it as naïve. Their position on NATO’s frontier and their painful history with Russia 
during the Soviet era make their view of NATO-Russia relations more pessimistic than those in 
Western Europe. Additionally, though Russia’s annexation of Crimea shocked the European 
security community overall, it was less surprising in the Baltic states. There, many had come to 
"11
expect such behavior, even if it was unclear what form Russian aggression would take or who 
would feel the impact thereof most strongly. 
Perspective on Europe’s Security Architecture 
 A discussion on the Baltic states’ perspective on their security environment, their threat 
assessments of Russia, and their expectations of the European security community in dealing 
with those specific threats must first examine how the three Baltic republics view the security 
architecture in which they participate. One can begin with an examination of the military 
capacity and defensibility of the Baltic states. The topography of the region is flat, with few 
natural defensive barriers, which favors a rapid offensive by an adversary. The small 
geographical size of all three countries further advantages an aggressor. The militaries of all three 
countries are small—slightly over 12,000 soldiers on active duty in Lithuania, and less than 
6,000 in Latvia and Estonia, as of October 2013—and rely heavily on calling up reserves in 
times of crisis.  All of the Baltic states lack air defense assets, and have limited infrastructure to 50
support the air operations of states from outside of the Baltic region due to the poor condition of 
former Soviet facilities that Russian forces held for several years after the collapse of the USSR. 
 These factors, taken together, demonstrate significant gaps between the capabilities that 
the Baltic states require to defend themselves and those that they actually possess. Therefore, 
they see one of the key functions of NATO as a mechanism for filling these capability gaps. 
Martin Hurt, the deputy director for the International Center for Defence and Security (ICDS) in 
Tallinn, said, 
You join NATO, and you bring whatever assets you have. It was evident that the Baltic 
states didn’t have, and would never have, all capabilities, but [...] I think that’s something 
that goes for every ally. Probably not the U.S., but most of the others have capability gaps 
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for which other allies need to step in and cover them. That’s the whole essence of NATO. 
I mean, if everybody were able to defend themselves, then NATO wouldn’t exist.  51
Kalev Stoicescu, a research fellow at ICDS, echoed these sentiments, stating that only the 
nuclear states of the Alliance had the military strength to defend themselves independently of 
NATO and adding that membership in the Alliance has enhanced Baltic security beyond what 
policymakers imagined in the years prior to their accession.  These notions are explicitly stated 52
at the policy- making level. The Latvian State Defense Concept of 2012 declares, “Military 
integration of the Baltic States makes it possible to jointly develop military capabilities that 
Latvia would not be able to develop separately.”  The document adds that such integration 53
enhances all of the Baltic countries’ ability to participate in NATO. The Estonian National 
Security Concept of 2010 also explicitly references the capability gap, stating, “Estonia’s 
military defence is based on the capability of initial independent defence and NATO’s collective 
defence,” and that “capabilities which are required for military defence and deterrence but which 
cannot be achieved by Estonia on its own will be ensured in co-operation with Allies in 
NATO.”  There is a recognition at an official level, therefore, that certain capabilities are 54
unobtainable by the Baltic states, yet are integral to their defense. NATO explicitly operates in 
this domain. 
 Though there are undeniable hard security implications of NATO membership, the Baltic 
states also note an ideological and institutional dimension to Alliance participation that 
compelled them to seek accession. In their view, NATO is an alliance of shared values, especially 
in the post-Cold War environment, and transcends the Cold War narrative of two opposing 
military- political blocs to continue to exist and thrive long after the opposing bloc, the Warsaw 
Pact, had dissolved. The Estonian National Security Concept of 2010, in discussing the 
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Alliance’s enlargement, argues that NATO expansion “has widened the area based on common 
democratic values, thus reinforcing European security.”  In 2001, the Latvian Ministry of 55
Foreign Affairs produced a fact sheet promoting NATO accession. In it, the Ministry prominently 
declared two of its main reasons for seeking membership as Latvia’s European identity and its 
respect for democracy. The document states, “Latvia is an integral part of Europe, not only 
geographically, but also economically, politically and culturally. [...] For Latvia, joining NATO is 
a practical way to contribute to the rebuilding of a new Europe, whole and free, for the 21st 
century.”  More explicitly, the publication argues, “The reason for NATOs existence is the 56
defence of certain territories and common values—democracy and the market economy. Purely 
military considerations about which countries are entitled to be ‘defensible’ and which are 
supposedly ‘indefensible’ should not determine which nations can thereby enjoy the security and 
stability that NATO membership brings.”  A joint statement by all three presidents of the Baltic 57
republics, together with President Barack Obama, similarly highlighted the shared transatlantic 
values of the Alliance.  58
 Tempting as it may be to dismiss these statements as rhetorical, and therefore without 
policy implications, there is evidence to indicate that policymakers at the decision-making level 
hold these beliefs, and that said beliefs motivated Baltic accession to the Alliance. Stoicescu 
contends that shared core values underpin the modern Alliance, arguing, “NATO has proven that 
it is not simply a military alliance, but it is a political alliance too, and it is a bond […] that glues 
the transatlantic community together. Of course, you always have to think of interests. You have 
to look at risks. But the question of common values is the one that is so important.”  Closely 59
linked with shared values is a shared identity between states. Stefanova writes, “A strong identity 
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(a Western European not a Slavic one), and the idea of the historical and legal continuity of their 
nation-states are central elements of the political thinking in all three [Baltic] countries.”  60
Stefanova further argues, “As former Soviet republics, issues of national sovereignty and 
distinctiveness, of a complete and irreversible breakaway from their Soviet past, and any 
possibility of being submerged into a new Russia sphere of influence, have for the Baltics 
become the measure and substance of statehood.”  Professor Karmo Tüür of the University of 61
Tartu spoke similarly of this rejection of a Slavic identity and embracing of a European one. He 
argues that, in discussing the national identities of the three Baltic countries, “it is not so much 
about who we, but who we are not. We are not Russia. This comes first.”  Hurt approached the 62
aspect of Estonian national identity in a distinct yet parallel way. Rather than framing accession 
to NATO as a rejection of Russian influence, he argues, “I think that it was a way of trying to 
join the Western community [...] I think we wanted to join the democratic club of free countries. 
That was the purpose.”  63
 While some may phrase the same idea differently, there is clear evidence that NATO 
membership for the three Baltic republics springs both from security concerns regarding their 
Russian neighbor and a view of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian national identities as 
European. NATO membership both offers security guarantees to the Baltic states that augment 
their standing defense capabilities and affirms their European history, identity, and heritage. 
Furthermore, these two concepts are not mutually exclusive. The concept of national sovereignty 
in all three Baltic states is firmly rooted not only in their security, but also in their national 
identity. Both factors motivate NATO membership because they are inseparable— the Baltic 
states’ history of occupation by the Soviet Union under Russian leadership shapes their 
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contemporary views on security. Occupation also further entrenched their view of their nations as 
European, compelling them to seek security by aligning not with their eastern neighbors, but 
with their western ones. One cannot, therefore, view ideology and security in isolation. 
 The Baltic countries generally accept that membership in NATO was necessarily linked 
with membership in the EU—that, from a politically and militarily strategic point, to be a 
member of one organization or the other would be far less effective than to be a member of both. 
Stoicescu remarked, “It didn’t make sense for us [in Estonia] to join one without the other,” 
adding that Estonia would have joined both organizations regardless of Latvia or Lithuania’s 
decisions on their own to accede.  Stefanova similarly observes, “Throughout the 1990s [the 64
Baltic] countries pursued a comprehensive strategy of integration with NATO and the EU as the 
dominant institutions of Western democracy.”  While she qualifies this observation, stating that 65
much of Eastern Europe adopted a similar mindset, she notes that the Baltic perspective on both 
institutions was more intense than other former Eastern Bloc nations due to the unique 
geopolitics of the Baltic region.  The three Baltic republics also see a bifurcation of roles 66
between NATO and the EU. The Latvian government stated officially in its push for NATO 
membership, “As with other European members of the Alliance, Latvia considers that being a 
member of both is entirely compatible. Indeed, as the contours of European security architecture 
are being re-drawn, there is logic in aligning EU candidate aspirations with their aspirations to 
join NATO.”  All three republics understood membership in both organizations to be essential in 67
their EU and NATO accession efforts, a view prevailing today.  
 This view of dual membership as essential stems from a recognition that membership in 
one without the other would result in gaps in security. In discussing the European security 
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community, Stefanova writes, “A particular security organisation (NATO) is the main security 
provider, and in Europe’s case the security institution is not coterminous with the actual network 
of most transaction flows (the EU).”  To phrase the same sentiment differently, while NATO 68
deals in security, the main advantage of EU membership to the Baltic states is economic.  This 69
view is common among those with a peripheral interest in, and knowledge of, the Baltic states’ 
membership in both groups. Such a view does not, however, fully carry over to decision-making 
levels in those countries. 
 While the Baltic states undeniably view NATO as a guarantor of their security, they 
ascribe a security function to the EU as well. However, this view is not universally shared, and 
most see the EU’s security role as less central than that of NATO. The manner in which the 
Baltic states (and other states near Russia) view the union is noticeably distinct, however, from 
the manner in which states in Western Europe view the union. Hurt observes,  
When other countries join the EU [...] , it’s much about economic growth and so on, to be 
part of a single market. I think that, if you look at the Baltic states, [...] there was another 
reason, and that was to become a member of the club so that we could say that we’re 
together with our neighbors and friends, and we left our enemy behind us. Now, the 
economic growth and [...] the other benefits from joining the EU are also there, and 
they’re important, but I think that we also saw a security dimension that many countries 
had not really seen who want to join the EU—especially, the further you go from Russia, 
the more you see the other reasons for joining the EU.  70
The State Defense Concept of Latvia also explicitly references the security functions of the EU 
through the Solidarity Clause, stating that “the EU for Latvia is an additional instrument for 
strengthening national security and defence.”  Additionally, the Baltic states view the EU as a 71
mechanism tying together non-NATO states whose security is still intertwined with, and integral 
to, that of the Baltic region as a whole—namely, Finland and Sweden.  The Nordic states 72
engage in defense cooperation that excludes the Baltic states, yet the participation of all five 
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Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden—is integral to Baltic 
regional security, and other regional initiatives such as the Council of Baltic Sea States take little 
to no substantive action to bridge the division between states in the Nordic-Baltic region.  73
Therefore, the Baltic states perceive that the provision for the common welfare of EU states 
creates incentives for EU members to enhance the security, in a limited sense, of other members. 
 Despite the Baltic states’ view of a security role for the EU as outlined above, they do not 
ascribe the same weight to the EU’s perceived security functions as they do to NATO. A number 
of those at the decision-making level have historically seen EU membership as insufficient to 
guarantee their security. Hurt plays down any expectation that the Union would act in a manner 
similar to NATO in the event of open conflict, saying that the Baltic states “were not looking at 
the EU as some kind of legal framework, saying that [...] we believe that if somebody were to 
attack us, that the EU would come and help us.”  Latvia argued fervently in the years prior to its 74
accession to both the EU and NATO that membership in the Union, though it would bolster their 
security, was not sufficient and “excludes the important trans-Atlantic link,” stating, “There can 
be no regional solutions to the security of the Baltic region. There is a broad consensus in the 
region that involvement of North American partners in the Baltic area is indispensable.”  The 75
Estonian National Security Concept makes no mention of the EU in its section on defense 
policy.  The Latvian State Defense Concept references the union once, and only in passing, in 76
its section on “Strengthening of National Defence Capabilities,”  while in Lithuania’s National 77
Security Strategy, the only reference to security in the section pertaining to EU participation 
pledges to “contribute to the creation of an effective EU foreign, security and defence policy” 
and “to the development of European civilian and military capabilities.”  78
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 There is an obvious gap between the rhetoric on the EU’s security role and the value that 
policymakers in the Baltic states assign it. The reasons behind this stem from the differences in 
how the security roles of NATO and the EU have manifested themselves. NATO members 
routinely train and cooperate in preparation for Article V missions that require the defense of the 
territory of member-states, something for which there is no analogous EU endeavor. The EU can 
fill a crucial security role that NATO does not address, but largely in matters that one can classify 
as internal security. Two major elements are the Schengen Area, which establishes common 
standards for admission of foreigners to the EU, and criminal intelligence sharing through 
Europol. These can augment the security of the Baltic states when one considers the hybrid 
nature of Crimea’s annexation, in which the Russian armed forces infiltrated Ukrainian territory 
under the pretext of supporting ethnic Russian minorites.  Should an aggressor state employ 79
similar tactics against the Baltic states, the quasi-covert nature of such an operation would 
necessitate the aid of internal security services, such as border security or counterintelligence 
services. With regards to these assets, the EU is better equipped to provide them than NATO. The 
Estonian National Security Concept explicitly references the internal security benefits of 
membership in the EU and their role in Estonian security and defense policies.  80
 The Baltic states clearly distinguish between the benefits of EU membership and 
participation in NATO, assessing the Alliance as the primary guarantor of their security. Their 
assessment of the EU as an essential aspect of the security of Europe generally—and, 
consequently, of the Baltic region in particular—separates them from their other European 
counterparts. Baltic concerns about a hybrid threat from Russia, particularly one that 
incorporates Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, furthers the Baltic republics’ belief in the 
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necessity of the EU as a security institution, especially in matters of internal security that are 
more suited to respond to a threat that is not overtly military in nature. Additionally, the 
confluence of security concerns and shared ideals among member-states motivated the accession 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the EU just as it motivated their pursuit of NATO 
membership—indeed, citing shared values as a catalyst for the pursuit of EU membership would 
appear to be an obvious assertion given the frequent rhetoric of the EU as a project of European 
common values. There is overlap in the Baltic states, therefore, between the perspectives on EU 
membership and on participation in NATO. As demonstrated, however, the benefits of 
membership in the Union are not seen as interchangeable with the benefits of NATO 
membership, though the Baltic perspective on the EU’s roles differ measurably from those of 
their European neighbors. 
Assessing the Threat 
 As diverse as the history and domestic politics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania may be, 
the nature of their security environment regarding Russia ties the three Baltic republics together. 
In particular, their absorption into the Soviet Union after the Second World War unified the 
Baltic states in their attitudes on what threatens their nations and the region as a whole. 
Consequently, an anti-Russian attitude persists in all three countries and permeates political 
decision-making regarding foreign policy. The accession of the Baltic states to NATO and the 
EU in 2004, as well as the decision to pursue this course of action in unison rather than 
unilaterally, is indicative of this common assessment of Russia’s stance as it pertains to the three 
countries and to the region in general. It would be a mistake, however, to characterize the 
position of the three Baltic republics as monolithic or uniform. As noted, there is great overlap in 
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their stances. Even so, one must do well to note the differences in specific threat assessments. 
The extent to which those in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania see threats from Russia against their 
territory and sovereignty specifically in a varied manner, to say nothing of the many assessments 
regarding the nature of such a threat. Generally, there is considerable agreement at the decision-
making levels in the Baltic capitals that Russia has the capacity to threaten all of the Baltic 
republics in isolation, and that Russia’s views on the expansion of NATO and the EU foster a 
paranoid vision of what such an expansion might entail. Whether Russia will ever strike the 
Baltic states, either overtly or covertly, and what method it will use should it decide to do so, is 
very much in dispute. 
Examining Russian Motives and Strategic Culture 
 Positive characterizations of Russia’s motives and mindset by the three Baltic states are 
sparse; the portrait they paint of their neighbor is one of a paranoid state, engaged in patterns of 
deceptive and destabilizing behavior while convinced that their foes engage in the same behavior 
against them—and, in no uncertain terms, leaders in the Baltic states see Russia as a threat. 
Latvian President Raimonds Vējonis, in remarks delivered in Washington, DC, stated, “We could 
very precisely use the allegory of a cold climate to describe what is happening in Europe and 
security today. In the Baltic region, the cold weather in wintertime comes not from the Arctic. It 
comes from the east—from Russia.”  Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves spoke similarly 81
lines, stating that Russia’s recent behavior in seeking to block nations— including by force—
from freely joining NATO and the EU threatened international principles granting nations a right 
to choose their alliances.  Additionally, he characterized Russia’s annexation of Crimea as an 82
Anschluss, evoking the memory of Nazi Germany’s annexation of Austria before the outbreak of 
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World War II in Europe, claiming that it was “the proper term for what happened in Crimea.”  83
Ilves’ repeated use of the term Anschluss to describe events in Crimea demonstrates a concerted 
effort to depict Russia’s behavior both as morally reprehensible and as dangerous to the Baltic 
region and to the entire international community. The Lithuanian government has printed and 
disseminated a preparedness guide, for civilians and military personnel alike, should open 
conflict arise.  Elaborating on the guide, Lithuanian Defense Minister Juozas Olekas declared 84
that Russian behavior directly motivated its production and distribution, stating, “When Russia 
started its aggression in Ukraine, our citizens here in Lithuania understood that our neighbor is 
not friendly.”  Even if the Lithuanian government does not see the likelihood of war with Russia 85
as high, the guide still serves to characterize Russia as an existential threat to Lithuania. 
 While shying away from the Nazi imagery invoked by Ilves, Stoicescu does share the 
assessment that Russia poses a threat to the Baltic states, saying, “It’s not anything hypothetical 
anymore, unfortunately. Having seen President Putin’s and Russia’s behavior since Russia 
against Georgia in 2008, and in Ukraine just early last year[...] I think there is enough reason to 
believe that everything that we considered as the darkest and very theoretical scenarios, we have 
to count them as being realistic these days.”  He cites the Kremlin’s pursuit of policies intended 86
to weaken its neighbors as evidence of a Russia engaging in destabilization, arguing, “In their 
traditional sense, [Russia] would like to see neighboring countries vulnerable, prone to Russian 
manipulation. They hate seeing small neighbors that are independent from them.”  Hurt argues 87
that there was never a time in which the Baltic political leadership entertained the notion of 
cooperation with Russia, observing, “There was no thinking in the Baltic states that Russia [...] 
since 1991 is a friendly nation, comparable with Germany and Portugal and Norway and all 
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those other democratic states. For us, what is happening right now is […] not a surprise by any 
means.”  The consistent and strong distrust of Russia’s motives and intentions, even in the 88
immediate post-Cold War environment and at a time when NATO reached out earnestly to Russia 
in an effort to foster cooperation, indicates a belief that Russia is both intrinsically opposed to 
and incapable of cooperation. 
 Policymakers in the Baltic states tend to view Russia’s mindset as paranoid in relation to 
their assessment of NATO intentions. Russia made explicitly clear its distrust for the Alliance 
when Putin signed a document designating the Alliance and its expansion as a threat to Russian 
security, a designation panned by the Baltic states and by NATO as a whole.  Russia has often 89
characterized the Alliance’s expansion as a provocation towards Russia, and Putin has used 
rhetoric that very strongly insinuates that if Russia believes conflict to be inevitable, it will not 
wait for the beginning of hostilities, but rather will strike first.  This position, combined with a 90
haste to consider worst-case scenarios and a confrontational (if not outright aggressive) foreign 
policy in its neighborhood, is a trait that many in the Baltic states believe can lead to a dangerous 
confrontation. In discussing the Kaliningrad Oblast, a Russian exclave bordering Lithuania, 
Stoicescu opines, “The Russians may think in their own terms, given the way that they are 
spoiled, that the West thinks as they do—that when they [i.e. Russia] grab Crimea, the West, 
using this crisis situation, will try to grab Kaliningrad Oblast from them. Of course, that is not 
the case, because we don’t think like them and we don’t act like them, but they may think like 
that.”  One should note that the Lithuanian National Security Strategy expresses the need to 91
“seek to enhance mutual trust with the Russian Federation in the field of security,”  which 92
would appear to undercut the notion of Baltic mistrust of Russia. However, Lithuania produced 
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the document prior to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and may simply reference cooperation 
with Russia for diplomatic purposes, rather than out of a genuine belief in the feasibility of 
building trust. 
 Closely linked to this characterization of Russia as paranoid is the impression that Russia 
views itself as mistreated by the West. There is a prevailing belief in the Baltic states that Russia 
feels itself maligned by NATO and its standing in the world denigrated by western nations. Tüür 
argues, “Russia actually and really [believes] that they are mistreated, that the West humiliates 
them—humiliated, at least until now, but now they have real options to fight back, to stand up 
from their knees.”  There is also a consistent Russian narrative that NATO has, through its 93
policy of enlargement, broken promises made in the immediate post-Cold War aftermath. Mary 
Elise Sarotte writes, “Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggressive actions in Georgia in 2008 
and Ukraine in 2014 were fueled in part by his ongoing resentment about what he sees as the 
West's broken pact over NATO expansion.”  She further notes that this narrative is misleading, 94
as there was never a formal agreement on limiting NATO expansion, with officials from Alliance 
member-states only implying that such an agreement would be possible.  There is evidence, 95
therefore, to support the Baltic states’ impression of a Russia that considers the West to have 
betrayed or otherwise maligned them. 
Determining the Nature of Potential Threats 
 The unified assessment of Russia’s worldview contrasts with the varied opinions on the 
exact manner in which a threat against the Baltic states in particular will arise. The distinctions 
here are not necessarily among the three Baltic republics, but rather within the policymaking 
ranks of all three states. There is disagreement over whether Russia is likely to come into conflict 
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with any of the Baltic republics at all, and even more so with respect to the manner in which such 
a conflict, should one occur, might manifest itself. Fears range from a hybrid operation of the 
sort executed in Crimea to an overt military attack under the cover of a military exercise. 
Concerns exist as well about the means by which Russia might provoke conflict—particularly, 
by leveraging issues of energy and of Russian minority populations. There is also disagreement 
over what the most likely target for Russia might be—be it Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or 
somewhere outside of the Baltic region entirely. Such a varied range of opinions has not yielded 
a consensus on what would be the most likely avenue for Russia to take, or even what the 
likelihood of Russian action against the Baltic states might be. 
 Russia’s annexation of Crimea made use of what many have referred to as hybrid 
warfare, characterized by the use of conventional military assets in unconventional manners. 
Defining the term, Pauli Järvenpää writes, “The increased popular focus on hybrid warfare and 
an emphasis on its non-physical dimensions have tended to mislead us into thinking of warfare 
as mainly stealth operations by ‘little green men,’ information operations, cyberattacks, and 
applications of political or economic pressure. In reality, however, hybrid actions have most 
often been supported by the use of conventional methods of warfare.”  In other words, hybrid 96
warfare is not simply the application of military force, or the application of covert methods of 
coercive force, but rather the application of the two in concert. 
 Observers now understand that Russian soldiers did participate, in some capacity, in the 
initial actions in Crimea that spurred the independence referendum. Armed gunmen established 
roadblocks and positioned themselves at or near critical government and civil infrastructure, 
significantly undercutting the control of local Ukrainian authorities. Many considered these 
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forces to be Russian soldiers without identifying insignia.  Such a threat has drawn the attention 97
of analysts and policymakers in the Nordic-Baltic region. Edward Lucas, Senior-Vice President 
at the Center for European Policy Analysis, notes that a significant vulnerability exists in Russian 
transit rights across Lithuania to Kaliningrad. He argues that passenger trains crossing Lithuania 
do not receive the same levels of scrutiny as others entering the Schengen Area, further noting 
that “this could therefore be a way of introducing irregular military forces” to Lithuania.  98
Järvenpää, noting the threat, argues, “It is important to react quickly and decisively to hybrid 
threats. Therefore the [Nordic-Baltic-Poland Nine] countries, allied and non-allied alike, would 
benefit from jointly designing and executing complex ‘comprehensive security’ or ‘total defense’ 
plans that would bring together these countries’ civilian and military authorities to work and 
integrate their separate efforts into a common response plan.”  99
 This is not the only mechanism by which Russia might attack the Baltic states that 
policymakers in the region fear. Numerous analysts and military planners have openly expressed 
concerns that Russia may use military exercises as cover for the movement of large numbers of 
combat-ready forces who are, in reality, preparing for combat against the Baltic States. Lucas 
notes several extremely provocative exercises carried out by the Russian Armed Forces: 
Zapad-09 and Ladoga, two concurrent exercises, rehearsed the invasion of the Baltic region and 
the use of nuclear weapons in support of military operations—including Warsaw as one of the 
potential targets.  A snap exercise (i.e. one called with little advance notice) conducted by 100
Russia rehearsed the seizure of Finland’s Åland Islands, Sweden’s Gotland Island, and 
Denmark’s Bornholm Island (see Map 4), the capture of which would have rendered 
reinforcement of the Baltic states nearly impossible.  Disturbingly, in June of 2014, the Russian 101
"26
Air Force conducted a simulated attack against Bornholm as the bulk of Denmark’s political elite 
had gathered there for a public policy event—a real attack of that nature would have eliminated 
much of Denmark’s political leadership and crippled the nation’s ability to respond.  102
 Drills such as these have been a major cause for concern in the Baltic states. Hurt argues 
that it is rational to predict that Russia would use snap drills as cover for a surprise attack, 
stating, “Why wouldn’t you camouflage your behavior with something that you do almost every 
week anyway? [...] That would be a perfectly logical move to make. Now we don’t really know 
if they are going to attack somebody or not, but since they do exercises on a weekly basis 
anyways, I think that would be a perfect way of camouflaging it.”  Hurt also does not view the 103
use of hybrid warfare as an option mutually exclusive with the use of a snap drill as cover for a 
surprise assault, saying, “I wouldn’t say that there is option one and option two [...] Both could 
be used together or independently.”  It is evident, therefore, that policymakers in the Baltic 104
consider the aforementioned potential forms of aggression as similarly realistic and dangerous. 
The threat assessment is not equal, however; where consideration of the use of a snap drill as 
cover for an attack is more speculative, hybrid attacks have played a part in both the Crimea 
annexation and the ongoing Donbas crisis. Therefore, if Russia is establishing a pattern of 
behavior, it will mirror their actions in Ukraine, rendering the hybrid threat a greater concern for 
the defense of the Baltic region. 
 If past actions are any indication of Russian behavior, one must consider the realm of 
cyberspace—an area in which Russia has threatened a number of its neighbors, the Baltic states 
included. In 2007, after the Estonian government relocated a Soviet-era monument against the 
wishes of its ethnic Russian population, Estonian websites experienced a crippling attack. The 
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distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, which flooded the target websites with 
overwhelming requests for information from many malicious servers, hit government, financial, 
and media websites hard.  The crude nature of the attack led many analysts to determine that 105
the Russian government was not at fault.  The Estonian government, however, found the 106
Kremlin responsible, citing the fact that Estonian investigators traced the attacks back to 
locations in Russia with ties to the Putin administration, as well as obstinacy from the Russian 
Public Prosecutor’s Office when Estonia requested legal cooperation on its behalf.  Even if 107
Putin’s administration was not directly responsible for the DDoS operation, the attack still 
underscored the vulnerability of the Baltic states to an attack if Russia should decide to carry one 
out. A year later, the Russo-Georgian War underscored this vulnerability when a wave of 
cyberattacks directed against Georgia struck critical websites as hostilities were unfolding.  As 108
in Estonia, Russia denied responsibility. By its nature, cyber warfare allows the Kremlin (or any 
other aggressor) to have near total deniability in the course of an attack, making retaliation all 
but impossible. 
 Russia has also historically used the dependence of its neighbors on natural gas against 
them, a fact not lost on policymakers in the Baltic. Europe saw a particularly salient example of 
this in late 2005 and early 2006, when the Russian state-owned company Gazprom accused 
Ukraine of siphoning natural gas intended for Central and Western Europe and more than 
quadrupled the price of gas that they had charged Ukraine, from $50 to $230 per 1000 cubic 
meters.  When Ukraine denied the charges and refused to pay the inflated rates, Gazprom 109
halted shipments of gas to Ukraine—a move that left Ukraine and the rest of Europe without 
Russian natural gas during a particularly frigid winter.  Ukraine ultimately had little choice but 110
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to accept Gazprom’s terms to resume normal imports. It also admitted to siphoning gas 
shipments not intended for Ukrainian consumption. 
 Episodes such as the 2006 Ukraine gas crisis underscore the security and political 
dimensions of energy dependence. Rojas Masiulis, Lithuania’s Minister of Energy, stated bluntly 
in remarks delivered in Washington, D.C., “Energy is being used as a political weapon.”  In 111
particular, the Baltic states are extremely exposed to disruptions in supply. None of the three 
Baltic countries have natural gas deposits, and as of 2014, all three imported natural gas from 
Gazprom exclusively.  An EU-led stress test gauged the ability of member-states to cope with a 112
complete cessation of Russian transport of natural gas. In such an instance, all of the Baltic 
countries would only be able to cope with the disruption for one week before the crisis would 
necessitate what the EU report termed non-market measures, or government intervention to 
mitigate the damage.  Estonia would be among the countries hardest hit: assuming a lack of 113
cooperation among EU member-states to address a shortfall, supplies of natural gas in Estonia 
would last only five days.  The particular vulnerability of the Baltic countries and their 114
complete dependence on Russia for access to natural gas makes the issue of energy security 
particularly salient, and underscores the dire consequences if Russia chooses to leverage this 
dependency against the three Baltic states. 
 The varied opinions on how Russia might leverage the Baltic states, should it choose to 
do so, match equally varied assessments of if and where they might apply pressure. In examining 
the vulnerabilities of an overt attack, numerous analysts consider the greatest vulnerability to lie 
just south of Lithuania, as the narrowest point between Kaliningrad and Belarus, Russia’s ally, 
crosses roughly 65 kilometers (≈ 41 miles) of Polish territory.  An attack of that nature would 115
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completely separate the Baltic states from their NATO allies. Stoicescu, in describing the 
situation, argues that the stretch of territory connecting Lithuania and Poland “is the new Fulda 
Gap,” referencing the city of Fulda, West Germany through which Alliance planners had 
considered a Soviet attack most likely during the Cold War.  Ilves expressed a similar 116
sentiment, who also called Belarus “the new Fulda Gap.”  Not all share this view, however: 117
Radosław Sikorsky, the former Foreign Minister for Poland, argued that “politics will trump 
geography” in the case of Kaliningrad due to the standing transit agreement with Lithuania 
regarding free passage to the exclave, as well as the generally weaker and smaller nature of 
Lithuania vis-à-vis Poland.  Former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius agrees, 118
saying, “We are afraid of any kind of possible provocations on transit routes, both railways, or 
gas pipeline, or electricity transit routes, which can be organized [...] to have some type of 
pretext from Moscow's side [...] to begin some aggressive actions.”  119
 Others, in examining the threat to the Baltic states, look at the heavy presence of Russian 
minorities in Latvia and Estonia. State statisticians recorded that 25 percent of Estonia’s 
residents,  and almost 27 percent of Latvia’s residents,  were ethnically Russian at the end of 120 121
2011. In contrast, only 5.8 percent of Lithuania’s population was ethnically Russian at the time 
of the 2011 census (see Figure 3).  While a quick assessment of the ethnic composition of the 122
three countries might lead one to conclude that both Latvia and Estonia are more likely to suffer 
from the sort of hybrid takeover experienced in Crimea, such a conclusion would hinge on a 
premise that lacks the nuance required to understand how ethnic minorities factor into the Baltic 
threat assessment. Stoicescu cautions, “These are very different regions, obviously. You cannot 
compare one to the other. You can’t compare the Baltics and Ukraine by far, even if people tend 
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to think in terms of analogies and, ‘Oh, there were Russians in Donbas [...], and there are 
Russians here in eastern Estonia and Latvia.’ They’re very different things.”  A more cautious 123
assessment of the situation in Latvia and Estonia would yield evidence suggesting that there are 
differences in opinion among ethnic Russians in both countries. Those in Latvia, for example, are 
more inclined to show disillusionment with the government in Riga and express greater 
enthusiasm for Moscow, whereas residents of the Estonian border city of Narva, while they may 
not consider themselves to be truly Estonian, have developed a unique regional identity and are 
less sympathetic to the Russian government.  124
 One must note, however, that these statements playing down the threat from ethnic 
Russian minorities does not indicate an absence thereof. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s 
collapse and the independence of the former Soviet republics, each new state crafted laws 
concerning citizenship. In Latvia and Estonia, these laws largely barred ethnic Russians from 
attaining citizenship through requirements pertaining to language proficiency and genealogy. 
While both countries have since taken steps to remedy this, approximately 6 percent of Estonian 
residents  and 10 percent of Latvian residents  are non-citizens without citizenship of any 125 126
other state (see Figure 4). Though numerous organizations label this demographic as stateless, 
the Estonian and Latvian governments, as well as the EU, avoid this term. A 2004 EU report 
stated, “In Latvia, non-citizens under the 1995 Law on Status of citizens of the former USSR who 
are not citizens of Latvia or any other country are neither citizens, nor foreigners, nor stateless 
persons. A great proportion of the large Russians-speaking population of the country falls within 
this category, unknown in public international law. The same applies to non-citizens in 
Estonia.”  The lack of supranational legal protection heightens the potential vulnerability of 127
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those without citizenship of any state. In both Estonia and Latvia, the government issues so-
called alien’s passports to non-citizens.  Consequently, they have freedom of movement not 128
afforded to other stateless persons. Even so, there remain fewer legal protections for non-citizens 
in both states. 
 The legal dimension of non-citizenship and other issues that disproportionately affect 
ethnic Russians have social implications. This treatment can serve as a catalyst for resentment on 
the part of the minority population, with many expressing a sense of a lack of belonging in their 
own country and a sense of disappointment in and betrayal by their government.  Whether this 129
resentment might reach openly hostile levels is uncertain. It is not, however, without precedent, 
as seen in the 2007 relocation of a Soviet-era monument in Estonia. The Estonian government 
moved the monument, a bronze statue of a Soviet soldier, out of the center of Tallinn, provoking 
a furious response from the city’s Russian population. The ensuing riots resulted in scores of 
injuries and hundreds of arrests.  This flare-up of civil unrest underscores not only the 130
sensitivity of ethnicity in the Baltic states, but also the possibility that similar unrest might 
present a pretext for Russian intervention. Even if there is not an organic threat from a Russian 
fifth column in Latvia or Estonia, Russia may still use the grievances of ethnic Russians as a 
justification for action. 
 When one does not consider the Baltic states in isolation, there are those who argue that 
the threat to any of the three republics is very small when compared against threats to Russia’s 
other neighbors. Indeed, any threat assessment cannot look at one region in isolation, and must 
instead consist of a holistic view of the security position both of one’s own country and of one’s 
potential adversaries. The three Baltic republics engage in such an assessment. While references 
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to potential Russian targets aside from the Baltic states are absent from the stated security and 
defense policies of the three nations, all state that the likelihood of war is low, but present. The 
Estonian National Security Concept states, “A military attack against Estonia is unlikely in the 
present and near future. Nevertheless one cannot exclude this possibility in the longer 
perspective.”  Similarly, the Latvian State Defense Concept notes, “While the potential for 131
direct military confrontation on Latvian territory is relatively low, it cannot be completely ruled 
out.”  Lithuania’s National Security Strategy states, “Although there is no direct military threat 132
to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, a dynamic, complex and difficult to 
predict security environment poses certain external and internal risks, dangers and threats to the 
national security interests of the Republic of Lithuania.”  Thus, the official position of all three 133
Baltic states is that the risk of war is low. Here, the agreement ends, however, as the nature of 
what specific threats are most likely to arise, and where, are still debated. 
THE IMPACT ON BRUSSELS 
 Given that the Baltic states’ perception of the threat from Russia is both acute and 
persistent, policymakers in those countries were more vindicated than surprised at Russia’s 
behavior. Hurt describes Russia as “still very much similar to the Soviet Union in 1945 and 
1989,” and dismissing notions that NATO could have feasibly cooperated with Russia.  Erkki 134
Tori, the deputy defense counselor for the Estonian delegation to NATO, remarked that the sort 
of hybrid warfare that Russia employed in Crimea was not a novel concept to the Baltic 
countries, even as other NATO member-states reacted with shock to Russia’s actions.  Estonia 135
and Latvia had lobbied for Georgian participation in NATO’s MAP in 2008 and 2014 as well.  136
Though the delegations of those countries did not explicitly declare in 2008 that efforts at 
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countering or containing Russia motivated their support, the fact that they had far less concern 
for antagonizing Russia than their Western European counterparts is telling. At the 2015 NATO 
summit, Baltic delegations did state that “NATO should send a tough message to Moscow by 
inviting Georgia to join the MAP.”  With their ex-Warsaw Pact allies in NATO, the Baltic 137
republics have pressed NATO consistently for greater attention on Russia and the security of 
Eastern European members of the Alliance. The extent to which NATO—and the EU—will 
assuage their concerns, however, is less clear. 
Moving NATO’s Focus to the East 
 Central to the defense of the Baltic states is the credibility of NATO’s security guarantees. 
Though many within the Alliance consider the likelihood of an overt attack against the Baltic 
states to be low, the question of whether NATO would defend the region in such an instance is 
nevertheless important for reasons of credibility. The more likely a potential aggressor is to see 
NATO’s intentions to defend the region as genuine, the less likely an overt attack will be. 
Consequently, the likelihood of any invocation of NATO’s mutual defense clause would decrease 
as well. Hurt notes, “If you asked the question of whether Article V actually will be invoked if 
there is a need to invoke it […] I would say all [NATO] nations are prepared or ready to make 
the preparations so that this situation would never occur, because if you imagine what is the 
worst outcome, it is a situation where we [in NATO] need to go to war for each other.”  The 138
Baltic states, together with other Eastern European NATO member-states, have long pushed the 
Alliance to adopt a credible defense and deterrence posture along its eastern flank. Within 
NATO, however, what constitutes a credible posture is in dispute. 
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 Beginning in 2014, the United States undertook Operation Atlantic Resolve in an effort to 
bolster NATO readiness and reassure the Baltic states, as well as other Eastern European allies, 
that the Alliance stands ready to act on their behalf and remains committed to their defense.  139
Baltic governments acclaimed the announcement of the operation, viewing it as a concrete 
American guarantee of their security. Jesse Granger wrote of the announcement in Tallinn, “As 
he [Lt. Gen. Donald Campbell] addressed those in attendance, Campbell departed from his 
scripted remarks to confirm to the crowd that American forces were inbound to their country, to 
stay and train with their Estonian counterparts for an indefinite period. The audience expressed 
relief as they stood in applause of the general. Some in the crowd openly wept.”  As a public 140
political gesture, Atlantic Resolve had immediate positive effect in the Baltic countries from the 
moment of its unveiling. 
 Atlantic Resolve encompasses a number of US and Alliance operations and exercises to 
this effect. As part of the operation, NATO augmented its Baltic Air Policing mission with 
additional aircraft to conduct patrols of the airspace over the three Baltic republics.  141
Concomitantly, the United States, together with other Alliance members, rotated military 
detachments through Baltic and other Eastern European countries, prepositioning equipment in 
the region for quick use in the event of a crisis.  In the spring of 2015, a detachment of the 142
United States’ 2nd Cavalry Regiment undertook an 1,800 kilometer (≈ 1,100 mile) road march 
from Estonia to Germany in a demonstration of Alliance resolve.  A similar operation, Bayonet 143
Thrust, moved elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade from Estonia to Italy across 2,600 
kilometers (≈ 1,600 miles) in early November of the same year.  Operations such as these were 144
a highly visible demonstration of American and Allied commitment to the security and defense 
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of the Baltic countries. The Alliance also announced an expansion of its NRF in direct response 
to Russian activity in Ukraine. Previously at a strength of 13,000 personnel, NATO announced 
its intentions to boost its strength to 40,000 personnel.  NATO also announced the 145
establishment of the VJTF, a land component of 5,000 troops with air and maritime assets as 
needed to support it, intended to be a rapidly deployable spearhead force for the NRF.  146
 All of these NATO measures have assuaged fears in the Baltic region, reassuring 
policymakers of the Alliance’s commitment to their territorial defense and to deterring aggressive 
behavior on the part of Russia. Stoicescu, in describing the NATO’s deployments and exercises, 
states that the Baltic republics “have been successful thus far in NATO in [their] relationship 
with the United States in terms of defense,” adding that the American prepositioning of military 
equipment for a brigade-sized contingent of troops was a positive development for Alliance 
deterrence posture.  Hurt echoed Stoicescu’s sentiments, describing the overall trend as 147
positive, though he observed that NATO still tends to be more reactive to Russian behavior than 
proactive.  The Baltic states, however, sought stronger assurances. In mid-2015, all three Baltic 148
republics announced that they would call upon NATO to station a brigade in the Baltic region 
permanently, a measure that the Alliance has been wary of entertaining.  Jan Techau, the 149
director of Carnegie Europe, spoke at length about the perceived importance of a permanent 
NATO presence in the Baltic region: 
In the Baltic states […], there are tremendous doubts [about NATO’s security 
guarantees]. They’re not entirely sure whether the security guarantee is 100% reliable. 
And this is why they eagerly want other NATO member’s troops on their ground, 
stationed permanently, because they understand the very old rule inside NATO, which is 
that Article V is a piece of paper, and that the actual security guarantee comes from the 
fact that you have troops on the ground so that an attack on one is quite physically an 
attack on all. […] That’s what triggers a response. Article V in itself doesn’t trigger a 
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response. […] Their point of view [in the Baltic states] is that, as long as we don’t have 
this, as long as the Americans and the Germans and the French and the British are not 
here on a permanent basis, Article V is only a theoretical guarantee.  150
Techau noted further that the current rotational deployment scheme that NATO has adopted 
would fulfill this physical security requirement, and that the argument for a permanent stationing 
of troops in the Baltic region does not carry the day in NATO.  Even so, the Baltic states will 151
likely continue to argue alongside their Eastern European neighbors for just such a policy on the 
part of the Alliance. 
 Relevant to concerns in the Baltic region over the reliability of NATO’s defense 
commitments in the Baltic region is the debate over burden-sharing: the question of which state 
or states is responsible for the defense of Europe. The issue has manifested itself in the relative 
defense spending of Alliance member-states. At the 2014 NATO summit, members pledged to 
raise their defense spending to two percent of gross domestic product, or to maintain defense 
spending above that level if already doing so.  As discussed, the Baltic countries view NATO 152
as integral to their defense, filling gaps in their security that would otherwise leave them 
vulnerable. The question of what the Alliance and its members consider a fair burden, however, 
is distinct from whether raising defense spending to such levels would actually result in benefits 
for NATO’s effectiveness. Techau argues: 
The [two] percent metric looks weak when held against qualitative standards. It says 
nothing about the ability of a country to absorb the funds in such a way that produces 
concrete additional military capability. It also falls short in relating to actual threat 
assessments and other strategic requirements a government might define. For any of these 
requirements, the [two] percent metric is simply too static and too simplistic.  153
In Techau’s view, this metric has value as a vehicle for discussing issues of burden-sharing 
within the Alliance that one should not conflate with the practicality or efficacy of raising 
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defense spending.  Though two percent of GDP spent on defense does not represent beneficial 154
military expenditure, the fact that the Alliance has codified the issue, albeit in a non-binding way, 
highlights the contention that burden-sharing has caused in the alliance and sends a signal that 
the United States in particular does not wish to underwrite the full cost of Europe’s defense. 
Though the Baltic states do not interpret this request as an affront to the alliance’s defense 
commitments—indeed, Estonia had already increased its military budget in 2014 (see Table 1)  155
and has pledged to exceed two percent—it is an unambiguous assertion that the Alliance expects 
the Baltic states, and other NATO allies, to share more of the burden in European defense, at 
least in a symbolic sense. 
 Even if not fully satisfactory to the Baltic states, and in spite of debate over whether 
certain states contribute too much or too little to Europe’s defense, NATO’s posture on 
conventional threats is well-defined, and does offer reassurances for the region’s security. The 
Alliance’s ability to respond to hybrid or unconventional threats, however, is in question, as there 
is a mismatch between the pressure that NATO faces in responding to such threats and its ability 
to do so. To foster cooperation on cyber security, NATO established the Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn one year after the cyber attack against 
Estonia.  Even so, the efficacy of this, and other measures to address softer aspects of defense, 156
is in question. In discussing pressure on NATO to react to unconventional threats, Paul Ivan, a 
senior policy analyst with the European Policy Centre, remarks, “The pressure is there, but it’s 
true that in terms of capability and means of reacting to that, they’re not up to the job. […] The 
cyber security cooperation has increased, and NATO is developing capabilities which concern 
propaganda and other measures that they can take, but I don’t think that NATO is ready for 
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that.”  Techau describes the difficulty for NATO to coordinate responses to hybrid threats, 157
noting, “If you look at hybrid and cyber, these are security problems for which you need not only 
the military, but the private sector to a large extent, because the infrastructure is all owned 
privately […]. [You would need] the police forces [and] the interior ministries, because the 
hybrid threat touches on so many various fields that are not military […]. You basically need a 
sort of comprehensive cooperation that is very difficult to organize.”  In short, NATO 158
recognizes the changing nature of the threat to its member-states. Its capacity to address such a 
dynamic threat adequately, however, may require time to cultivate—if it is within NATO’s 
capabilities at all. 
Untapped Potential for the EU to Fill Security Gaps 
 NATO’s history constrains the options available to the Alliance in deterring and 
responding to softer, less conventional threats, even as NATO’s structure has evolved in an effort 
to meet these challenges. As stated, these gaps deal in aspects of what one can term homeland 
security: border protection, criminal intelligence sharing, and counter-propaganda, to name 
several. NATO also lacks the ability to insulate its member-states from economic shocks; as 
Russia uses trade and energy to pressure its neighbors, the ability to weather the disruption is 
crucial. Yet while NATO’s institutions do not appear to address these facets of homeland security, 
there are numerous EU institutions that deal exclusively in them. At least on paper, therefore, 
there is a tremendous amount of untapped potential for the EU to increase its role in the 
provision of security on the continent. Whether this will materialize in a coherent and robust 
fashion, however, is in serious doubt, as is the prospect of EU-NATO cooperation in a joint effort 
to close these security gaps. 
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 In examining covert and hybrid threats, border security is essential to the security of the 
Baltic states. The 2007 kidnapping of an Estonian security official on the Russia-Estonia border 
underscores the potential for small border transgressions to become a tool for leverage against 
any of the Baltic governments.  Additionally, any insertion of irregular forces necessitates the 159
exploitation of weaknesses in a nation’s border security. An institutionalized example of just such 
a weakness is in the transit of Russians across Lithuania bound to and from Kaliningrad; this 
group of travelers does not receive the same scrutiny to which other entrants to the Schengen 
Area are subject.  Small states only have so much in terms of resources to manage their 160
borders, though the comparatively short stretches of border for which they are responsible does 
lessen the burden of their obligations. The EU established Frontex as the Union’s external border 
service to better pool European resources and coordinate border security operations.  Though it 161
is largely dependent on Schengen-participant countries for its resources, it does have European 
Border Guard Teams (EBGTs) that offer fast response capabilities.  The EU can deploy these to 162
bolster security along the Union’s eastern border and safeguard Eastern European states against 
infiltration. However, the EU has largely tasked Frontex with addressing the migrant crisis 
currently affecting Europe, with the EU’s announcements regarding the agency and EBGTs 
largely concerning their increased role in detecting, processing, and often deporting asylum-
seekers.  An increased Frontex presence would likely require a boost in the number of 163
personnel working for the organization, which currently has only 300 staff members at its 
Warsaw headquarters,  as well as an expanded focus of Frontex’s mission. 164
 The EU has other tools at its disposal to address other aspects of homeland security: the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) has an Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) 
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intended “to provide intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness to the […] 
EEAS.”  It has also embarked on a campaign to counter Russian propaganda in Europe, 165
working to dispel misinformation about the EU.  The Union can also mobilize the criminal 166
intelligence sharing network established through Europol in a manner parallel to that of 
INTCEN, focusing on any internal destabilization efforts within the Baltic states. Tori 
specifically identified border security, criminal intelligence sharing, and strategic 
communications as areas of potential strength for the EU in the realm of European security.  167
 The actual prospects for cooperation within the Union on these issues, however, may not 
be as high as they are on paper. There is a gap between the EU’s mandate and the willingness of 
member-states to give Brussels power. In large part, this is due to a perception that these matters 
have been hallmarks of state sovereignty. Ilves states, “There are certain structural problems in 
the EU in that we have a High Commissioner for a Common [Foreign and] Security Policy, and 
at the same time […] a number of members do not want to actually give genuine foreign policy 
power to the European Union and […] with members not wanting to do anything on their own. 
Everything is falling in between the cracks.”  Techau observes that homeland security issues 168
tend to remain the prerogative of the member-states themselves, with little appetite for EU 
management thereof.  Steven Blockmans, the head of the EU Foreign Policy section at the 169
Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, echoed those sentiments, noting that while 
mechanisms exist for collaboration and the sharing of intelligence, this is largely carried out at a 
bilateral level and on an ad hoc basis due to a lack of trust in an EU-wide intelligence-sharing 
scheme.  He added, “Everything stands or falls with this level of trust through which a member 170
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state either under attack or the one holding information is willing to actually show solidarity or 
ask for cooperation of another member state.”  171
 EU-NATO cooperation is even less likely. In part, this is due to the reasons outlined 
above: NATO and the EU cannot coordinate on the defense of Europe if the EU is unable to take 
stock of its capabilities and make full use of them. Cooperation within the EU on security is 
therefore a necessary prerequisite for cooperation between the EU and NATO. Beyond this, 
however, despite the importance of both institutions in Europe’s security community, the EU and 
NATO seldom cooperate. While EU-NATO cooperation is not necessary in closing the gap 
between conventional and unconventional security, it would raise the efficacy thereof. Despite 
the potential benefits, there is little evidence to suggest that the two institutions will increase 
their cooperation sufficiently. Techau states bluntly, “NATO and the EU do not really work 
together. They work at the technical level as an exchange of information—they have some 
meetings at the technical level—but in terms of a really coordinated political approach to 
problems […] that’s not happening, and its not going to happen anytime soon.”  172
 The nonconventional security area in which the EU excels is in the economic realm. 
Together with the United States, the EU adopted a sanctions regime against Russia in response to 
the annexation of Crimea. Among other measures, the EU forbade the purchase or sale of 
financial products from or to Russian energy firms, defense companies, and state-owned banks; 
the sale of weapons or dual-use equipment to Russia; and importation from or investment in 
Crimea.  Russia retaliated with counter-sanctions against EU agricultural products, prompting 173
the Union to allocate funding totaling €500 million to compensate farmers adversely affected by 
the sanctions regime.  This has not been without contention. Blockmans notes the difficulty in 174
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reaching a consensus on a sanctions regime that ultimately forces some member-states to suffer 
economic harm: 
Any compromise entails almost in all cases a package deal, and as we’ve seen also in the 
context of the adoption of the sanctions against Russia, certain member states […] have 
shown their reluctance in adopting those sanctions or in supporting them, and have […] 
tried to extract benefits from other member states or from the European Commission in 
being compensated for the negative economic fallout that they’ve suffered whilst already 
being in negative growth, for example, for Italy or Greece. That has worked up until now 
[… but the sanctions] would have to be prolonged if indeed the intention was to 
effectuate behavioral change on the side of Russian decision makers in Russian foreign 
policy towards Ukraine.  175
Despite these difficulties, the EU proved an effective forum for the establishment of a robust 
sanctions regime and a capable guarantor of economic well-being for those states hardest hit by 
both the EU sanctions and the Russian counter-sanctions. 
 Closely linked to the question of economics is energy security, another area in which the 
EU has been active. In 2014, all EU member-states carried out stress tests of their energy 
infrastructure and consumption to determine the possible effects of a Russian suspension of gas 
shipments to EU states or a disruption in the gas pipeline routes through Ukraine.  The 176
European Commission, based on the results of these stress tests, issued a communiqué assessing 
mitigation tools, both at an EU level and on the basis of the needs of individual member-states.  177
Among the main findings was that unity among EU states, as well as neighboring European 
countries outside of the Union, would mitigate the impact of an energy supply shock, whether 
benign or malicious.  The EU has taken steps to foster cooperation of this sort through the 178
Third Energy Package, an effort to, among other things, open the energy market among the 
Union’s member-states and facilitate cross-border energy trade.  Where the Union has faltered 179
in areas of security in which it had great potential to succeed, it has demonstrated its capacity to 
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act as an instrument of both economic leverage against Russia and economic protection of its 
member-states. At least in this area, the EU fills a critical security role that NATO cannot meet. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 One finds few surprises in the assessment of the Baltic states of their security situation. In 
all three of the Baltic republics, both NATO and the EU are essential pillars of the security 
architecture in Europe, indispensable to the security of their own nations. Of the two, NATO has 
primacy of importance, having had the longest and clearest mandate for guaranteeing the security 
of its member-states. Even so, the Baltic states see aspects of their security that neither 
organization, in isolation, can meet in their totality. Additionally, though EU or NATO 
membership does confer intrinsic security benefits, these cannot guarantee the security of the 
Baltic countries—or any member-state—and both institutions must take concrete steps to back 
up any security guarantees that they offer. While the view of the EU as a potential security 
organization does depart from that of other Union member-states, it is understandable given the 
security environment of the Baltic states. 
 Similarly unsurprising is the Baltic states’ assessment of Russia’s intentions and 
motivations for its behavior. Given the long and painful shared history of the three Baltic 
republics with regards to Russia, especially during the post-World War II Soviet occupation, their 
interpretation of Russian behavior has been one of an antagonistic and revanchist Kremlin. 
Furthermore, this is a long-held view, not simply a reaction to Russian involvement in Georgia in 
2008, or in Ukraine beginning in 2014. Perhaps the only surprise is that Baltic governments 
reacted with less shock than their counterparts in Western Europe to Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea. One might expect the opposite to hold true, given the greater perception of danger on the 
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part of those states closest physically and historically to Russia. Yet one can best characterize the 
reaction less as one of shock (though the annexation of Crimea was a very unexpected event and 
did come as a surprise to, among other states, the Baltic republics) and more as one of 
vindication. The varied assessment within the Baltic states of the specific nature of the threat is 
understandable, and the disparity is likely more attributable to differences in personal 
assessments of the threat, rather than distinctions based on the perspectives of individual Baltic 
states. Overall, the three republics have a unified assessment of the EU and NATO’s role, and in 
their belief that Russia poses a grave threat to European security. Their unity on these issues 
makes the three Baltic states a more potent diplomatic force within those organizations. 
 There is clear evidence that both NATO and the EU have begun to move in the direction 
that the Baltic states have wanted. This is most apparent in NATO: the Alliance suspended 
activity on the NATO-Russia Council and announced an increase in rotating deployments to 
Eastern Europe, including very public displays of American military power. Baltic and Eastern 
European calls for more permanent bases for NATO forces on the Alliance’s eastern flank, 
however, met a colder reception in Brussels. With regards to the EU, its main contributions to the 
security of the Baltic states have been participation in the sanctions regime against Russia, the 
provision of economic assistance to lessen the effects of Russian counter-sanctions, and the 
measures taken to promote energy security. By no means are the Baltic states the only 
beneficiaries. Indeed, the sanctions and counter-sanctions had hit hardest those countries with 
close economic ties to Russia—including the three Baltic states. Yet a robust response from the 
EU was and remains to the clear benefit of the Baltic states’ firm position against Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and continued involvement in Ukraine’s Donbas region. 
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 At present, the security architecture in Europe has sufficed in responding to the dynamic 
threats that have faced members of the European security community. Hybrid warfare as carried 
out in Crimea, however, does appear to have taxed the flexibility of the two institutions in their 
responses, exposing gaps in need of closing to best ensure the security and stability of Europe in 
the future. As NATO remains firmly grounded in the application of conventional military power, 
it may find itself limited in its ability to respond to instances of hybrid warfare. There are steps 
that the Alliance can take, however: improving its information warfare and psychological 
operations capabilities to meet the evolving threat is essential, as is training its forces to secure 
and retain both hard and soft points of control. The failure of Ukraine to secure locations of 
political significance, most notably the parliament building in Simferopol, hamstrung its 
credibility throughout the crisis. With training, NATO can avoid making similar mistakes. 
 There is tremendous untapped potential for the EU to fill gaps that NATO cannot. The 
Union has institutions that, on paper, have the ability to respond to homeland security issues that 
would comprise the covert side of any hybrid operation. However, the EU’s border security, 
foreign intelligence gathering, and criminal intelligence sharing mechanisms can only be 
effective if member-states lend adequate support. While funding of these organs of the EU is 
essential, what is even more critical is cultivating the political will of member-states to engage in 
cooperation on this level and share certain powers, which have traditionally been the prerogative 
of sovereign states, with EU bodies. Absent this, a coordinated, EU-wide effort to bolster 
homeland security will necessarily fall victim to a stratification of internal policing and 
counterintelligence work along state lines. The consequences of this are not only apparent in 
countering hybrid operations, but also in other homeland security issues that confront European 
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states, from terrorism and non-state organized violence to migration to the transfer of illicit 
goods and laundered money across international boundaries. 
 It would be a gross overstatement to describe the security situation between Russia and 
the European security community as grave or as precarious. As of now, NATO, the EU, and the 
states that comprise them both have managed effective reactions to activities that threaten the 
security of Europe. While one could find fault with the steps that NATO has taken to reassure its 
Eastern European members, the Alliance has had to balance the needs and perspectives of 
Western European allies who, by virtue of their position, do not see the threat with a sense of 
severity, urgency, or immediacy analogous to that of their counterparts to the east. This is a 
balance that NATO has struck well, as has the EU, and there is reason to believe that both 
institutions will continue on this trend, with a stronger focus on the East than in years past as a 
lasting consequence of Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. Barring any major changes in Europe’s 
security environment, one can expect NATO to continue its efforts on securing its former Soviet 
and Warsaw Pact alliance members, particularly those most concerned by recent Russian 
behavior, in the near future. 
 This does not mean, however, that one should accept the current state of affairs in 
European security. To close the security gaps that hybrid warfare has exposed, EU member-states 
must be willing to cooperate and integrate more robustly on issues of homeland security. 
Furthermore, the EU and NATO must deepen their cooperation to ensure that they can fill all 
security gaps, and that each organization is capable of marshaling its strengths to cover the 
weaknesses of the other. In their own ways, NATO and the EU are responsible for the peace and 
prosperity that Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War. The challenge from 
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Russia that Europe faces today may not be of the same existential nature as in the Cold War. Yet 
it is a challenge that, if not met properly, will be a tremendous opportunity missed for the 
European security community to deepen its integration, and will leave the frontier of Europe 
needlessly vulnerable. The Baltic perspective on Europe’s security environment not only 
demonstrates the situation as it is, but also as it could be. It now falls upon the members of 
Europe’s security community to determine its future.  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APPENDICES 
Appendix A — Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Initialisms 
CCDCOE Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy
DDoS Distributed denial of service
EBGT European Border Guard Team
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EEAS European External Action Service
EEC European Economic Community
ESDP European Security and Defense Policy
EU European Union
Europol European Police Office
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
Frontex European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GDR German Democratic Republic 
ICDS International Center for Defence and Security
IFOR Implementation Force
INTCEN Intelligence Analysis Centre
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
KFOR Kosovo Force
MAP Membership Action Plan
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF NATO Response Force
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP Partnership for Peace
SFOR Stabilization Force
UN United Nations
VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
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Appendix B — Maps 
"  
Map 1: A thematic map showing European states based on their membership in either 
NATO or the EU, or in both organizations. 
Girard Bucello IV, “EU and NATO Membership,” Thematic map, (March 26, 2016). 
"58
"  
Map 2: A thematic map showing membership in the EU by date of accession to the Union. 
East and West Germany are not divided on this map. German reunification in 1990 
resulted in East German accession to the EU immediately upon reunification. 
Girard Bucello IV, “EU Membership by Year,” Thematic map, (March 26, 2016). 
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"  
Map 3: A thematic map showing membership in NATO by date of accession to the Alliance. 
East and West Germany are divided on this map, reflecting German reunification in 1990. 
Patrick Neil, “History of NATO Enlargement,” Thematic map, (September 15, 2008), https://
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/History_of_NATO_enlargement.svg/
1024px-History_of_NATO_enlargement.svg.png. 
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"  
Map 4: A map of the Baltic Sea region, with bodies of water, islands, political boundaries, 
national capitals, and other key cities labeled. 
Norman Einstein, “Baltic Sea Map,” Political map, (May 25, 2006), https://
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/Baltic_Sea_map.png.  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Appendix C — Figures 
Figure 1: A timeline of events in NATO’s history, with the accession of member-states and 
with other events in European security relevant to the scope of this paper labeled. 
Girard Bucello IV, “Timeline of events affecting European security,” (April 4, 2016).  
"62
"  
Figure 2: A timeline of the history of the EU and its key predecessor institutions, with the 
accession of member-states labeled. 
Girard Bucello IV, “Timeline of the European Union and its Predecessor Institutions,” (April 4, 
2016).  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Figure 3: The ethnic composition of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as of 2011. 
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, “Ethnic Composition of Population,” Latvijas Statistika, 
2011, http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/tautassk_11/tautassk_11__tsk2011_provizor/
TSK11-03.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=a79839fe-11ba-4ecd-8cc3-4035692c5fc8. 
Statistics Estonia, “Population by Place of Residence and Ethnic Nationality, 31 December 
2011,” Statistics Estonia, December 31, 2011, http://www.stat.ee/67693/. 
Statistics Lithuania, “Population by Ethnicity and Municipality,” March 15, 2013, http://
osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/217110/Population_by_ethnicity_municipality.xls/
b7398067-7158-4926-a18c-bc98895c433e.  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Figure 4: The population of Estonia and Latvia by citizenship of residents. 
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, “Population of Latvia by Citizenship at the Beginning of the 
Year,” Latvijas Statistika, 2015, http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/Sociala/
Sociala__ikgad__iedz__iedzskaits/IS0090.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?
rxid=a79839fe-11ba-4ecd-8cc3-4035692c5fc8. 
“Citizenship,” Estonia.eu, April 6, 2016, http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html. 
"  
Figure 5: The preferred citizenship of stateless residents of Estonia as of 2008. 
Priit Järve and Vadim Poleshchuk, “Country Report: Estonia” (European Union Democracy 
Observatory, 2010), http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/19611.  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Appendix D — Tables 
Table 1: Military expenditures of NATO member-states as a percentage of GDP. 
“Military Expenditure (% of GDP),” World Bank, 2016, http://beta.data.worldbank.org/?
end=2014&indicators=MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS&start=2010. 
Country 2010 military expenditure (% of GDP)
2014 military expenditure 
(% of GDP)
Change in mil. 
expenditure (pp)
Albania 1.6 1.3 -0.3
Belgium 1.1 1.0 -0.1
Bulgaria 1.8 1.5 -0.3
Canada 1.2 1.0 -0.2
Croatia 1.7 1.6 -0.1
Czech 
Republic
1.2 1.0 -0.2
Denmark 1.4 1.2 -0.2
Estonia 1.7 1.9 0.2
France 2.3 2.2 -0.1
Germany 1.4 1.2 -0.2
Greece 2.7 2.3 -0.4
Hungary 1.0 0.9 -0.1
Iceland 0.2 0.0 -0.2
Italy 1.7 1.5 -0.2
Latvia 1.1 1.0 -0.1
Lithuania 0.9 0.9 0
Luxembourg 0.5 0.4 -0.1
Netherlands 1.3 1.2 -0.1
Norway 1.5 1.5 0
Poland 1.8 1.9 0.1
Portugal 2.0 1.8 -0.2
Romania 1.2 1.4 0.2
Slovakia 1.3 1.0 -0.3
Slovenia 1.6 1.0 -0.6
Spain 1.4 1.2 -0.2
Turkey 2.5 2.2 -0.3
UK 2.4 2.0 -0.4
US 4.7 3.5 -1.2
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Table 2: Total production, consumption, importation, and exportation of natural gas 
among EU members in 2014. Net exporters are shown in italics. 
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, 2016, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/.  
Country
Natural gas (mil m3)
Total production Total consumption Total exports Total imports
Austria 1,224 7,764 2,373 7,797
Belgium 0 15,800 845 16,850
Bulgaria 278 2,975 0 2,697
Croatia 1,805 2,810 422 1,079
Cyprus 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 245 7,508 1 7,249
Denmark 4,612 3,160 2,093 625
Estonia 0 530 0 530
Finland 3 3,082 0 3,080
France 18 35,760 3,544 41,180
Germany 10,060 77,480 19,240 86,840
Greece 5 2,924 0 2,931
Hungary 1,854 8,348 740 8,941
Ireland 152 4,408 0 4,246
Italy 7,149 61,910 237 55,760
Latvia 0 1,410 0 1,410
Lithuania 0 3,240 0 3,240
Luxembourg 5 983 0 979
Malta 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 70,250 39,980 59,300 29,100
Poland 6,080 17,860 76 11,820
Portugal 0 4,005 0 4,069
Romania 11,400 12,100 242 801
Slovakia 100 4,014 3 4,236
Slovenia 3 770 0 767
Spain 24 27,160 8,219 36,390
Sweden 0 892 0 892
United Kingdom 38,520 70,240 10,550 42,830
TOTAL 153,787 417,113 107,885 376,339
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